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WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System.

OSD Review Completed

NRO review(s) completed.

JCS review(s) completed.

NSA review(s) completed.

NGA Review Completed.

XX TS-203364
5-28

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

24 MAR 1976

Honorable George H. Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear George:

For several years, there have been increasing complaints regarding intelligence compartmentation. The basic charges have been that compartmentation and the compartmentation process impedes and delays dissemination; denies access to needed information; and is costly and wastes resources. More than twenty-five studies and working groups have addressed the problem in the last two years and have generally substantiated the complaints.

Defense's stake in this area is significant because, as the studies show, compartmentation has the most effect on operational commands and impacts on our ability to:

a. Improve the quality and timeliness of Indications and Warning and allow for better flexibility and economy in handling and using warning intelligence throughout the military chain.

b. Increase the utility of pertinent national intelligence in tactical operations.

c. Improve mixed national-tactical system support of combat and combat-related requirements, routinely and in crises.

One of the more recent initiatives is a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the compartmentation of satellite reconnaissance which concludes that the restrictions and prohibitions of the present TALENT-KEYHOLE compartmentation program are no longer required. The JCS recommend easing the present restrictions. A copy of their study and proposal is attached.

We have reviewed the JCS work and their conclusions and find them to be a prudent and logical extension of the current decompartmentation program. I, therefore, recommend that the JCS proposal be considered promptly.

Sincerely,

Warm regards,

Robert Ellsworth

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cy #3 Series B

Attachment

Copy to: (w/o attachments)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-36-76
6 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Compartmentation of Satellite Reconnaissance Products (S)

TS-203364-73

1. (S) Reference a White House memorandum, 27 November 1973, "Modification of the Security Controls for the Products of Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites (S)," which authorized decompartmentation of the fact of satellite photographic reconnaissance and certain products of such reconnaissance.

2. (S) The program approved by the reference for imagery satellites and the related program approved* by the US Intelligence Board for SIGINT satellites have been in operation for over 2 years and are resulting in significant increases in the utility of satellite reconnaissance products to military commanders in the planning and execution of military operations. There is no known evidence that during this time reliance on normal SECRET and TOP SECRET security precautions has resulted in any compromise of decompartmented satellite photography.

3. (S/TK) In recognition of the needs of military commanders and Government agencies for the products of satellite reconnaissance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a study of the effects of continuing TALENT KEYHOLE controls on the availability of needed information. The study contained in Appendix A indicates that these controls are no longer required for adequate security protection and that their removal will improve the flow of required satellite products to military commanders and their staffs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. Satellite-collected imagery and non-COMINT product and selected sensor data should be authorized for release at SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL levels and protected in accordance with

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Classified by TK-1
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFY ON Notification by
Originator

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TOP SECRET

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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

Executive Order 11652. An exception will be specially sensitive material classified TOP SECRET, again in accordance with Executive Order 11652. COMINT is sufficiently protected by provisions of the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations of the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. The pure "fact of" a SIGINT satellite reconnaissance program should be removed from the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment and:

(1) Imagery satellite reconnaissance should be classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL.

(2) ELINT satellite reconnaissance should be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

(3) COMINT satellite reconnaissance should be classified SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY.

c. There should be no blanket restriction on release of decompartmented satellite products to allies. Foreign disclosure should be based on the National Disclosure Policy.

d. Existing collateral provisions, in accordance with DOD Instruction 5200.1R and DOD Directive 5210.8 for use in an emergency, including disclosure to uncleared persons, should be applied.

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially like that contained in Appendix B, be forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence seeking his cooperation in obtaining the necessary security easement from the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

George S. Brown

GEORGE S. BROWN
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

Reference: [redacted] 25X1

* US Intelligence Board memorandum, USIB-SC-10.5/17, 23 January 1973, "Sanitization, Downgrading and Decontrol of SIGINT Data Derived from TALENT-KEYHOLE Sources"

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APPENDIX A

COMPARTMENTATION OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION (S)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. (S/TK) STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To establish the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the use by military commanders of satellite reconnaissance products and related sensor data, to determine the impact of the TALENT KEYHOLE security system on the availability of this information, and to recommend corrective changes to current policies and procedures.

II. (S/TK) DEFINITIONS

A. (U) Sensitive Compartmented Information. For the purpose of this study, all information and material bearing special intelligence community caveats indicating restricted handling within present and future intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 545, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

B. (S/TK) Compartmentation and Decompartmentation. The term "compartmentation" in this study refers to control of information in the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System. The term "decompartmentation" in this study refers to removal of information from the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System and provision for its handling in accordance with Executive Order 11652, or the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR), as appropriate.

C. (S/TK) TALENT Control System (TCS). A control system established for maximum security protection of TALENT material and information, including the existence of such material and information. The TCS protects intelligence

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products derived from the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), which is a single national program conducted covertly by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

D. (S/TK) TALENT KEYHOLE. An especially designated compartment of the TCS, established by Presidential directive, which is applicable only to satellite reconnaissance.

E. (U) Sanitization. For the purposes of this study, the process of removing or otherwise concealing the source of an intelligence report or document in order to permit the information to be disseminated outside a compartment. Sanitization differs from decompartmentation in that the latter permits attribution to a particular source.

F. (U) Collateral. For the purposes of this study, security systems based on Executive Order 11652, in contrast to special compartmented systems.

III. (S/TK) SCOPE

A. This study considers the use of satellite derived products by US military commanders and their staffs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies at the seat of government, through the theater commanders, to subordinate tactical commanders in the field. The study encompasses military uses for information for all purposes. Specifically included are:

1. Imagery and SIGINT product information from satellite reconnaissance systems for all military purposes, including indications and warning, contingency planning, current intelligence, technical intelligence, crisis management, targeting, mapping, charting, geodesy, photogrammetric point positioning, and data base maintenance.

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APPENDIX A

2. Information on satellite sensors needed by commanders to permit exploitation of products.

B. This study is limited to the effect of the TALENT KEYHOLE security compartment on US military information needs. Other compartments, such as Special Intelligence (SI), are not evaluated as to their effects on military information needs nor are any conclusions drawn with regard to them. Where removal of SIGINT products from the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment is discussed, continued protection of COMINT through imposition of COMINT controls is understood.

C. This study is concerned with the effects of compartmentation, not security classification. The issues associated with the declassification of intelligence information are significantly different from those raised by decompartmentation.

IV. (S/TK) ASSUMPTIONS

A. (S/TK) After decompartmentation, satellite system information and satellite products will remain classified in accordance with Executive Order 11652 or (in the case of COMINT) handled within COMINT channels.

B. (U) The provisions of collateral and COMINT security systems are adequate to protect sensitive defense information.

V. (TS/TK) BACKGROUND

A. Establishment of the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System.

The TALENT KEYHOLE compartment of the TCS was established by Presidential directive on 26 August 1960. The directive assigned responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) "...for determining all questions involved in the continued protection and control of satellite materials and information...." The Secretary of Defense was made responsible for implementing the system within the

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Department of Defense (DOD) and was permitted to delegate certain authority to the level of the Senior Intelligence Officers (SIOs) serving as US Intelligence Board (USIB) members, including Military Department Chiefs of Intelligence. The SIO for OSD is the Director, DIA. The DIA TALENT Control Officer (TCO) is the principal TALENT security official responsible to the OSD SIO. Within DOD, implementation was accomplished by promulgation of the TALENT Control Manual* over the signature of the DIA TCO acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense.** The latest edition of the TALENT Control Manual was promulgated on 15 March 1974. (This manual does not yet reflect policy changes resulting from the November 1973 Presidential decision to authorize decompartmentation of significant portions of TALENT KEYHOLE imagery materials. It also does not contain detailed procedures for implementing the January 1973 USIB policy statement on sanitization, downgrading, and decontrol of SIGINT material derived from TALENT KEYHOLE sources.)

B. Description of the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System

1. The TALENT KEYHOLE Control System is a centralized and highly formalized control system which provides for:

a. Precise definitions of need-to-know and restricted authority for determining need to know.

b. Special personnel investigative requirements and access authorization procedures.

*DOD TS-5001.2 (M-1), March 1974, "Talent Control System Manual"
**DOD S-5001.2 (M-1), May 1967, "Implementation of Talent Control System Manual"

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c. Security indoctrination and termination oaths to be signed by all personnel to whom the information is disclosed.

d. Centralized recording of all personnel access authorization.

e. Special physical and transmission security rules significantly more stringent than those associated with noncompartmented information storage and transmission.

f. A special document control system providing for centralized registry of all hard copy documents prepared within the system.

g. DCI approval of all changes to the system.

h. Emergency dissemination guidance.

2. The TALENT KEYHOLE Control System has expanded considerably during the years of its existence. At the time of this study, over 38,000 DOD individuals (excluding NSA and NRO) are indoctrinated under the system. TALENT KEYHOLE control centers exist (within DOD) at the following activities:

a. DIA (for DIA, OJCS, and OSD).

b. Other Defense agencies.

c. The Service Intelligence Chiefs (for the Military Departments).

d. Intelligence production agencies under the Military Departments and other subordinate Service commands and agencies.

e. Each of the unified and specified command headquarters and component command headquarters.

f. Subordinate unit headquarters such as attack carriers, fleet flagships, numbered air forces, and Army corps headquarters.

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g. Selected Defense Attache offices.

h. Corporate offices conducting analysis and production under contract to DOD.

C. Developments within the TALENT KEYHOLE SYSTEM. During the years of the TALENT KEYHOLE system's existence, procedures have been established which have gradually permitted more and more satellite products to be sanitized to permit dissemination outside the TALENT KEYHOLE system for use, mainly by military commanders. At first, this sanitization was possible only where there existed ostensible nonsatellite sources for the information or provided for advanced placement of sealed packages which could be released only in the event of commitment of US Forces to action. At present, sanitization authority exists for a wide variety of purposes, including automated data bases, US and NATO tactical materials, estimates, mapping and charting, contingency and strike plans, and weapons employment plans.

D. Decompartmentation of Information. Because of the continuing need to make information more readily available to commanders, on 23 November 1973, a Presidential Directive approved a program for modifying TALENT KEYHOLE controls to permit selected photographic materials attributed to satellite sources to be decompartmented. The directive also authorized disclosure at the SECRET level of the "fact of" a photo satellite program. This directive explicitly excluded imagery derived from future systems and satellite SIGINT (to include "fact of" a SIGINT satellite program) from the decompartmentation program, retained the TALENT KEYHOLE system for control of materials not decompartmented, and directed the DCI to continue to protect sensitive satellite materials. The

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USIB/DCI-approved implementation of this authority now provides for the decompartmentation of all materials from obsolete systems (KH-4, 5, and 7) and from mapping cameras and the majority of imagery and derived information from 25X1A [redacted] as required for specific uses. Material retained within the TALENT KEYHOLE system is that which could reveal sensitive system capabilities, qualitative coverage [redacted] 25X1A and overall program effectiveness; selected substantive matters deemed of particular sensitivity by the SIOs; and relative success or limitations of the systems. Implementation of this new authority has been widely delegated within DOD.

E. Continuing Restrictions. The main goal of sanitization and decompartmentation has been to make available to commanders and operating elements who are not authorized TALENT KEYHOLE access the information they need to carry out their missions and to plan for contingency operations. However, TALENT KEYHOLE secure facilities must be maintained at most intelligence production organizations, since sanitization and decompartmentation must be carried out within TALENT KEYHOLE approved facilities and by TALENT KEYHOLE cleared personnel. Authority exists to decompartment bulk film from the KH-4, 5, and [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted]

Initial film (original negative, duplicate negative, duplicate positive) from current systems, however, is not eligible for decompartmentation. Imagery greater than two generations from the original can only be decompartmented after application of detailed criteria and procedures.

F. Satellite SIGINT. As noted above, satellite SIGINT was specifically excluded from the new decompartmentation program approved in November 1973. There are, however, some outstanding sanitization authorities which permit 25X1 dissemination of much satellite-derived ELINT [redacted] information at SECRET level. Sanitization of other satellite SIGINT requires case-by-case approval by the Chairman of the USIB SIGINT committee. The "fact of" satellite SIGINT reconnaissance remains compartmented within the TALENT KEYHOLE system.

VI. (TS/TK) DISCUSSION

A. (S/TK) Requirements for Satellite Products

1. General. Military requirements for satellite reconnaissance products are many and varied, in terms of both the uses to which the products are put and the impact of compartmentation. The following analysis describes the major uses of satellite reconnaissance products, the major consumers and producers of intelligence based on satellite reconnaissance, and the impact of compartmentation in each of these major subcategories.

2. Event-Related Intelligence. In this category are included indications and warning intelligence, current intelligence, crisis management information support, bomb damage assessment, and direct support to combat operations. Aside from the NCA, military commanders and staffs in Washington and theater headquarters of the commanders of the unified and specified commands and component commanders are the major consumers of this information. During combat, tactical force commanders and staffs in the affected area become primary consumers.

a. Some consumers in this category have TALENT KEYHOLE clearances or are served by TALENT KEYHOLE cleared current intelligence production staffs. Thus, some essential needs of the peacetime commander can be met by the present partial decompartmentation program. The sanitization rules for SIGINT and the partial decompartmentation program now in force for imagery, however, delay the dissemination of data to individuals without TALENT KEYHOLE access authorization, since time is required to determine what can be released in collateral channels versus what must remain compartmented. Particularly in the case of

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25X1 [redacted] must be decompartmented or sanitized by TALENT KEYHOLE cleared intelligence analysts. Especially in the case of imagery, this seriously delays dissemination to the final consumer who does not have a TALENT KEYHOLE clearance.

b. In wartime, this delay would be both more common and more severe, because TALENT KEYHOLE access is limited to commanders and principal staff officers at middle echelons (in the Army not below division or separated brigade). In this case, the TALENT KEYHOLE material from initial processing facilities cannot be sent direct. It must be routed through higher echelon headquarters for sanitization or decompartmentation before being delivered to the commander in the field, except for selected COMINT and ELINT sanitized by NSA under procedures now in development.

c. The requirement for review and sanitization at higher echelons impacts severely on the exchange of digital data. Several costly efforts to develop a single computer system that would support both non-compartmented and compartmented users have so far been unsuccessful. Alternative approaches are now being explored which require duplication of computer mainframes at one location to process compartmented information separately. This problem is exemplified by the Tactical Information Processing and Interpretation (TIPI) System which was designed to support the tactical commander with all-source data. Although the display control storage and retrieval segment of TIPI was developed at a cost of over $40 million, it is currently restricted from using compartmented data within the automated data processing segment because of security constraints. This problem will not be totally resolved by elimination of TALENT KEYHOLE restrictions as long as other compartments exist.

d. In the event-related category, the need is for timely dissemination of data direct to collateral level analysts. Decompartmentation should be accomplished as early as feasible in the processing sequence.

3. Technical Intelligence. The production of military technical intelligence is concentrated in the Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate of DIA and the Service S&T production agencies (Air Force Foreign Technology Division; Naval Intelligence Support Center; Army Missile Intelligence Agency; Army Foreign Science and Technology Center; and the Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency). R&D organizations with which the production agencies are affiliated assist in S&T production and are also its main consumers outside of the

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Washington community. However, the increasing need of the operational commander for technical intelligence is making him a major consumer--with timeliness demands even more stringent than for other consumers. S&T production includes detailed analysis of military systems, assessments of integrated wartime use of the systems, specific responses to time urgent questions, technical inputs to current intelligence and event reporting, and preliminary assessments of unusual events. Each of the S&T production agencies use and produce all-source intelligence. All have found that specific procedures and limitations associated with the TALENT KEYHOLE compartmentation and security systems cause delays, administrative burdens, and unnecessary costs.

a. The large number of people engaged in S&T production creates a major problem in administering the rigorous personnel security procedures and physical criteria required by compartmentation. Another burden arises from the physical security criteria associated with TALENT KEYHOLE compartmentation: more rigorous facility construction criteria, alarm systems, document control and storage in TALENT KEYHOLE computer facilities, libraries, printing plants, and work areas (all of which have complementing collateral facilities).

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physical security costs could be considerably reduced

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if satellite ELINT and imagery were handled at a collateral level. Support of S&T analysis often dictates the need for contractor secure facilities, whose costs are ultimately reflected in S&T intelligence contracts. One S&T producer currently sponsors 11 such contractor facilities and has established over 360 compartmented clearances for contractor personnel.

b. Timeliness is becoming an increasingly critical aspect of the S&T program. This trend has caused many advances in data exchange through automated processing, facsimile transmission, and direct circuit accesses. However, part of this progress in timeliness is offset by continuing compartmentation constraints which limit consumer access to available data.

(1) Over 160 all-source S&T compartmented products are currently being produced. A counterpart collateral product is published for 60 of these documents for consumers with limited clearances and facilities. It is noted that, for these 60 documents, distribution is perhaps two and one-half times that of their all-source counterparts, indicating that nearly three-fourths of S&T customers receive only sanitized data.

(2) Besides the disadvantages of limited dissemination, there is an obvious loss of analyst time in preparing and updating both collateral and all-source products.

(3) While decompartmentation of TALENT KEYHOLE imagery and ELINT would not totally eliminate the need for both all-source and collateral products on certain subjects, the quality of the collateral

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product would be considerably improved, since it would contain the precise information needed for technical and engineering analysis. Such information is now considerably restricted by compartmentation.

(4) Finally, S&T products are rarely generated solely on the basis of a single information source and usually contain analytical results from other intelligence producers. While decompartmentation and sanitization guidelines exist, they are not automatically applied to products from other intelligence producers. In an extreme case, almost a year was necessary to obtain a degraded set of equipment specifications at the collateral level.

c. All proposals for development and procurement of a new weapon system must contain a section which addresses the relevant threat. Because of the large number of people involved with administration and management who do not have TALENT KEYHOLE access (contract officers, estimators, budgeting and programming contractors), a proposal including the threat statement is generally constrained to the SECRET level and is not always based on all-source intelligence. The sanitized threat, without the compartmented information to provide specific proof and justification, often fails to provide convincing basis for program approval. While an all-source threat is often produced, it seems inevitable that the more widely disseminated collateral version would set the tenor for the decision-makers.

4. Target Intelligence and Target Materials. These data and materials are produced mainly by DIA, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and production centers managed by

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the commanders of the unified and specified commands. This finished intelligence--which includes products from the DIA Automated Installation Intelligence File as well as graphics produced under the Tactical Target Materials Program, the Air Target Materials Program and physical vulnerability data--is used by intelligence and operational planning staffs and aircrews for threat assessment, target selection and weighting, force application, mission planning, and target study activities.

a. The production centers are engaged in a wide variety of intelligence processing and exploitation activities which do not require TALENT KEYHOLE clearances, as well as those which do. Information derived from all sources is stored in both compartmented and noncompartmented automated data bases. Under partial decompartmentation programs, the transfer of information from TALENT KEYHOLE level photo interpreter files requires a time-consuming process of analyst review, decompartmentation, and reformatting of the applicable data. This situation has resulted in highly enriched compartmented data files which receive limited usage, while collateral level files, containing generally less precise data on the same installations, are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use on a wide scale as authoritative data files. If the raw materials used by the production centers were decompartmented, considerable improvement in efficiency would be possible, and the user data bases would be greatly enriched with more complete, precise, and timely intelligence.

b. In a combat situation, rapid tactical targeting accomplished either at the theater component command headquarters or by subordinate tactical commanders

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(Army corps, numbered air force, aircraft carrier) is seriously delayed since up-to-date imagery cannot be transferred at the non-code word level direct from the processing site to the tactical headquarters.

c. In summary, the current partial decompartmentation program has provided additional latitude in the use of satellite imagery for targeting support programs. However there are still severe limitations on the quality and timeliness of data which can be used for these collateral products. These limitations restrict dissemination of complete information essential for both conventional and nuclear target planning.

5. Order of Battle. This is an area of intelligence production where collateral level, timely materials are needed most urgently. The customers for this information include the entire military intelligence, planning, [illegible] operational communities at all echelons down to squad, individual ship, and individual aircraft level. The producers of this intelligence are largely concentrated at DIA, unified and specified command headquarters, and component command intelligence production centers, although subordinate tactical elements are significant contributors. Very few of the customers have TALENT KEYHOLE clearances; only a portion of the intelligence producers have the cleared personnel or facilities. For example, as of February 1975, there were approximately 2,800 imagery interpreters employed in the "intelligence community" of which 1,470, or a full 50 percent, belonged to DOD tactical military units where TALENT KEYHOLE clearances are virtually nonexistent.

a. With the continuing decline in production and analytical personnel resources, the community can no longer afford a system in which this effort is duplicated at various echelons. Accordingly, DIA is

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developing a delegated production program designed to insure that basic order of battle production is accomplished by the single intelligence element with the primary need and that all other consumers rely on the product of the single producer. For example, US Army, Europe, would be the only producer of Warsaw Pact ground order of battle; Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) would be the only producer of Soviet Pacific Fleet order of battle. All other consumers, including the national level in Washington, would be linked to these decentralized order of battle data bases for information on these subjects.

b. The interpreters, analysts, and intelligence officers manning these decentralized production centers need raw material, both imagery and ELINT, at the collateral level. Since these analysts will be the primary screeners of materials covering their area responsibility and since the whole community will be depending upon them for spot reports of new, significant information, it is essential that they receive the raw materials in a timely manner. These analysts will also require some sensor information, as discussed in paragraph VI.D. below, to permit them to exploit the raw material fully.

6. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy.

a. DMA has the responsibility in the DOD for all mapping, charting, and geodesy programs. Satellite imagery accounts for approximately 90 percent of DMA source imagery material requirements. Owing to this extensive use of satellite imagery, over 50 percent of DMA's 8,000 personnel are currently cleared for TALENT KEYHOLE secure work areas and require agency

expenditures for the extra security personnel and facilities demanded by the TALENT KEYHOLE system. Some mapping is also accomplished by the unified and specified commands and components. These units must also have access to satellite imagery. If all imagery were removed from the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment, the DMA field offices would no longer have a need for TALENT KEYHOLE secure facilities. This could result in up to 8 man years of saving; additional saving of 3 man years would probably result with the reduced security requirements at the three production centers. In addition, approximately 900 special bring-up background investigations are required every year. Complete decompartmentation of TALENT KEYHOLE imagery would lower this figure to about 100 per year.

b. The materials now authorized for decompartmentation are adequate for most products, but time is lost in physically preparing the TALENT KEYHOLE materials for decompartmentation. This can range from a relatively

25X1D quick removal of TALENT KEYHOLE markings from film headers and trailers [redacted]

25X1D [redacted] and applying the appropriate collateral markings, to longer times such as that required to

25X1D insure that [redacted] is below established resolution thresholds and that no sensitive

25X1D substantive items are contained therein. [redacted] photography is very often used for products such as orthophotos, orthopictomaps, pictomaps, and photo-mosaics which are prepared to meet time-urgent requirements. The delay in release of these products at a collateral level could have serious effects on the customer. If all imagery were removed from the

TALENT KEYHOLE compartment, this delay would be significantly reduced. The first Pave Strike Point Positioning Data Base decompartmentation took approximately 3 months. This was an initial effort, but, even in subsequent decompartmentation efforts, approximately 1 month will still be required to decompartment this material. 25X1

[redacted]

B. (S/TK) Resource Issues

1. General. In the preceding paragraphs of this discussion, there are references to inefficiencies and administrative costs imposed by the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System which could be avoided if full decompartmentation of imagery and non-COMINT satellite products is approved. (Cost saving will not be realized in the Army while other compartments such as SI continue to exist. The resource implications of transferring security control of these products from the TALENT KEYHOLE system to the collateral system is unknown.) In the course of this study, an attempt was made to quantify these inefficiencies and administrative costs, in order to permit understanding of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the compartmentation system. It proved

infeasible to quantify all such costs, largely because in many cases the costs of COMINT compartment administration are intermingled with TALENT KEYHOLE compartment administration and because the inefficiencies occur through lost time and effort on the part of people, such as substantive intelligence analysts, who are engaged in compartment matters only part time. Accordingly, it has only been possible to assemble exemplary, illustrative data on inefficiencies and costs. It is emphasized that the data in this paragraph are estimates only and are only representative of what is believed to be a much larger expenditure of resources. The commands which provided these figures pointed out that elimination of the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment would not in all cases permit actual budget reductions; rather, that it would permit more productive use of existing resources in the orders of magnitude indicated.

2. Unified and Specified Command Estimates.

a. Pacific Command

(1) PACAF estimated annual saving includes:

(a) The amount of [redacted] for expanded background investigations which would no longer be required for 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) personnel. NRO 25X1

(b) The amount of [redacted] per year alarm system maintenance at 548th RTG. NRO 25X

(c) Five manyears for 24-hour access control at 548th RTG.

(d) The amount of [redacted] per year for separate collateral and TALENT KEYHOLE film libraries at 548th RTG. NRO 25X

(e) The amount of [redacted] for TALENT KEYHOLE NRO 25X1
administration at PACAF headquarters.

(f) The amount of [redacted] for TALENT KEYHOLE NRO 25X1
administration at 5th Air Force headquarters.

(g) The amount of [redacted] for separate TALENT NRO 25X1
KEYHOLE and collateral computer support.

(2) PACFLT estimated annual saving includes:

(a) Four hundred and fifty man hours for TALENT KEYHOLE personnel administration.

(b) Three man years for TALENT KEYHOLE materials handling.

(c) One man year for TALENT KEYHOLE communications handling.

(d) Two hundred and twenty-five computer hours for separate publication of TALENT KEYHOLE Interpretation Reports; and

(e) 390 man hours for integration of collateral and TALENT KEYHOLE work at FICPAC photo, litho, and support shops.

b. US European Command

(1) USAREUR estimated saving includes:

(a) One man year for TALENT KEYHOLE section in Topographic Center.

(b) The amount of [redacted] plus 1.5 man years NRO 25X
in Topographic Center photo lab.

(2) Other man year costs in time lost by action officers and analysts because of TALENT KEYHOLE administrative restrictions are characterized as extensive but are not quantified.

c. Atlantic Command estimated annual saving includes:

25X1NRO (1) The amount of [redacted] for consolidation of collateral and TALENT KEYHOLE film libraries at Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic (FICEURLANT)

(2) The amount of [redacted] NRO 25X1 in manpower and material savings from integrated collateral and TALENT KEYHOLE use of FICEURLANT photo lab.

(3) The amount of [redacted] NRO 25X1 in manpower saving from time now spent in handling TALENT KEYHOLE materials at FICEURLANT.

(4) The amount of [redacted] NRO 25X1 for expanded background investigations of aircraft carrier TALENT KEYHOLE cleared personnel.

d. Other unified and specified commands did not quantify estimated cost saving but emphasized that there are losses in efficient use of manpower caused by TALENT KEYHOLE compartment regulations and the separation of TALENT KEYHOLE materials from other materials used by action officers and analysts. All commands predicted more timely dissemination of satellite derived information to commanders with a need to know should current compartmentation rules be relaxed.

C. (TS/TK) ELINT Considerations

1. For purposes of this paper, ELINT is information derived from electronic intercept of foreign active electronic systems and includes location, signal parameters, identification, and time of intercept. Some ELINT obtained by satellite can now be sanitized and disseminated at the collateral level in accordance with procedures established by USIB (attachment to SIGINT Committee memorandum, USIB-SC-10.5/17, 23 January 1973). This procedure permits some disclosure of satellite ELINT outside the TALENT KEYHOLE system, particularly for entry into automated electronic order of battle data bases. However, the bulk of ELINT sanitizations require timeconsuming case-by-case decisions by the SIOs of

Washington agencies. In all cases, attribution to satellite source, even in the most general sense, is prohibited, and ELINT intercepts for which a non-satellite source cannot be inferred must remain in the compartment.

2. As in the case with imagery satellites, the US SIGINT satellite program is an "open" secret. That is, the United States is generally recognized to have a satellite SIGINT program, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] It is appropriate to continue classification of the "fact of" the SIGINT satellite program in order to preclude official public acknowledgement, with the risk of diplomatic or political action by the USSR or other countries. The extra protection for "fact of" provided by the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment is unnecessary.

[redacted] 25X1

in this study is to decompartment only products and selected sensor data needed to exploit those products. Details of sources such as orbit parameters are not

25X1 proposed for decompartmentation. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] It must be emphasized that this discussion proposes decompartmentation in the sense that products disseminated outside TALENT KEYHOLE channels are attributed to "satellite" sources in general not to any specific satellite nor with any specific description of satellite operations, orbits, or system parameters other than those needed by analysts to exploit the data. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

4. It is emphasized that this study proposes removal of TALENT KEYHOLE controls from satellite products. Operational data will remain within the TALENT KEYHOLE or other compartments, and COMINT will still be protected by COMINT controls.

D. (S/TK) Requirement for Sensor Information

1. There are several types of information on satellite sensors themselves that are needed for exploitation of satellite products. This information is needed by intelligence production personnel, particularly imagery interpreters and ELINT analysts, in order that they may analyze the information they receive and produce the required intelligence for the commanders' use. Hence, this information is needed at the same level of classification as the product being processed. To the extent that the satellite product is processed outside TALENT KEYHOLE channels by non-TALENT KEYHOLE cleared personnel, the selected sensor information will also have to be made available outside TALENT KEYHOLE channels. Other sensor information will remain in TALENT KEYHOLE or other compartment.

2. This information generally falls in the category of sensor data as opposed to collection platform data. For imagery, this includes precise camera focal length, film format, angle off vertical of optical axis, Greenwich Mean Time of exposure, and geographic coordinates at nadir. For ELINT, this would be limited to a description of the uncertainties associated with a measurement or calculation having to do with location or emitter technical parameters i.e., confidence factor of the ellipse formed by the major and minor axes and accuracy of measurement of radio frequency, pulse repetition frequency, pulse width, and antenna scan rate.

E. (TS/TK) Sensitivity of Satellite Reconnaissance Information

1. The sensitivity of satellite reconnaissance programs derives from their capability, the value of intelligence collected, their susceptibility to countermeasures and political sensitivity, and their cost. Such considerations led to the 1960 Presidential decision to place the "continued protection and control of satellite material and information" in the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System.

2. Today, there is a continuing and even more compelling need to provide maximum protection for specific information about certain highly sophisticated satellite capabilities and selected sensitive products derived therefrom. Specifically, information revealing the mission, targets, spacecraft vulnerabilities and location, ground system, and success of certain programs must be given special protection to prevent possible application of simple and easily accomplished countermeasures by target countries. If these countermeasures were implemented, the United States would lose significant intelligence vital to its security.

25X1

3. However, it must also be recognized that, because of the increasing value of, and reliance upon, satellite-collected intelligence, there must be a concerted effort to facilitate the timely flow of this intelligence to the users. This flow is currently restricted by the TCS and sanitization/decompartmentation procedures.

4. Therefore, to improve both the protection of truly sensitive information and its flow to the users, it is imperative to examine carefully and weigh the desired results in terms of the risks involved.

5. Risk Versus Gain Assessment

a. The risk, applicable to this discussion, is the chance of compromising intelligence collection capabilities and successes and the relative ease with which countermeasures could be applied to deny, partially or completely, intelligence of vital importance to the United States:

(1) As discussed in the previous section, there are some satellite reconnaissance programs which use highly sophisticated techniques to collect significant volumes of intelligence vital to the United States.

25X1 [redacted]

(2) However, there are other less sophisticated satellite reconnaissance programs which provide intelligence, the partial or total loss of which would be serious but would not require maximum security protection.

b. Gain

(1) More timely and complete intelligence available to the military decisionmaker. 25X

(2) The considerable manpower and facilities resources currently required to sanitize satellite reconnaissance intelligence product and for maintenance of the TCS will be saved.

c. Other Factors Affecting Assessment

The following factors must also be considered in assessing risk versus gain:

(1) Risk factors

(a) When the Presidential order was promulgated in 1960, the only significant satellite reconnaissance collection was imagery, and the volume was relatively small compared to current production.

(b) The collateral security system protects sensitive information such as SIOP targeting data.

(c) The COMINT security system protects other non-satellite-collected COMINT.

(d) The USSR has explicitly accepted "national technical means of verification," which are tacitly understood to include reconnaissance satellites, and has agreed not to interfere with such means of verifying compliance with SAL treaties.

(e) The USSR has undertaken a satellite reconnaissance program of its own, which reduces the likelihood it will take military or diplomatic steps to inhibit the continuation of the U.S. program.

(f) Considerable information on the systems and their capabilities is available to the USSR through telemetry intercept, satellite tracking systems, and open literature on the technology involved. Most photo parameters can be inferred

25X

25X1 [redacted]

Consequently, only such precise technical capabilities as the best resolution of these imagery systems now require extra security protection. General capabilities, including capabilities which could be inferred from examination of the products, are already available to the USSR from the sources indicated.

25X1 [redacted]

(h) The USSR can be expected to continue its program of EMCON, cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception within limits determined by the resource costs of such efforts and its perception of U.S. willingness to tolerate activity prescribed by the strategic arms limitation treaty.

(2) Benefit factors

(a) Since 1960, satellite-collected intelligence has been expanded to include SIGINT and the [redacted] 25X

(b) Reliance upon satellite-collected intelligence has increased significantly because of:

1 Its increased value and volume relative to other sources of intelligence. 25X

2 The shrinkage of other intelligence sources.

3 Potentially increased satellite collection capabilities to provide near real time intelligence for the military decisionmakers in time-critical situations.

d. Summary

The benefits of removing satellite reconnaissance intelligence products from the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment outweigh the risks in view of current circumstances because:

(1) Military commanders must have timely and complete intelligence to support informed decisionmaking.

(2) Sanitization procedures seriously hamper the timely flow and availability of vital intelligence.

(3) Adequate security protection of the intelligence is provided by existing collateral and COMINT classification and security procedures of, and special access mechanisms authorized by, E.O. 11652 and the CISR.

(4) The delays and costs imposed by continued TALENT KEYHOLE restrictions on dissemination of satellite products are no longer warranted by the sensitivity of the program.

(5) Data on systems and sensors, other than that required for product exploitation, will still be protected within the TALENT KEYHOLE or other compartments.

F. (S) FOREIGN DISCLOSURE. Current USIB decompartmentation policy requires that all decompartmented photographic materials be automatically marked "Not Releaseable to Foreign Nationals." This is often interpreted as a blanket restriction against foreign disclosure. As such it hinders the essential interchange of military intelligence between commanders and their

allied counterparts. Since in fact there are several exceptions to this seemingly blanket restriction, it would seem more appropriate to omit it, leaving the determination on foreign disclosure to be made in accordance with established National Disclosure Policy procedures.

VII. (TS/TK) CONCLUSIONS

A. Military commanders, their staff, and the intelligence agencies and elements which serve them require the product of imagery and non-COMINT satellites at the collateral level as soon as possible after acquisition, and with fewer use-inhibiting regulations. They also require certain sensor information at the collateral level to permit exploitation of the product. This will permit exploitation in a collateral environment. Selective decompartmentation, by virtue of the fact that the selection process itself requires the expenditure of time and effort, delays and impedes the dissemination of information, creates unnecessary administrative costs, and causes many inefficiencies in use of scarce intelligence production resources, including maintenance of some duplicative (compartmented and noncompartmented) production facilities and personnel complements. Non-TK dissemination of the entire product would avoid delays, administrative costs, and waste of resources. These costs are no longer justified by the sensitivity of satellite reconnaissance systems; collateral and COMINT security precautions are sufficient. These include stringent controls on personnel access, storage, transmission, and destruction.

B. The necessary easements will require a request from the Secretary of Defense, the cooperation of the DCI, and the approval of the President.

C. There should be no blanket restriction against foreign disclosure of decompartmented products of satellite reconnaissance. Actual release of such data to allies should be governed by established foreign disclosure policies and procedures.

D. The continued classification of the "fact of" photo-satellite reconnaissance at the SECRET level cannot be justified under the criteria of Executive Order 11652.

E. In order for satellite products to be fully useful to military commanders in all circumstances, the provision for declassification under emergency conditions in accordance with DOD Instructions 5200.1-R and 5210.8 should be applied. Procedures should also be established for sanitization of satellite derived-date to the unclassified level, where appropriate.

VIII. (S/TK) RECOMMENDATIONS. An easement to present security restrictions be sought from the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the cooperation of the DCI. The easement sought should permit timely dissemination of all satellite imagery and SIGINT products, in accordance with Executive Order 11652, or the CISR to appropriate intelligence production agencies and operational commands.

[redacted] 25X1

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Compartmentation of Products of Satellite Reconnaissance (S)

1. (S) Reference a White House memorandum, 27 November 1973, "Modification of the Security Controls for the Products of Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites."

2. (S) The program approved by the reference for imaging satellites and the related program approved* by the US Intelligence Board for SIGINT satellites have been in operation for over 2 years and have resulted in significant increases in the utility of satellite reconnaissance products within the Department of Defense, particularly with respect to the planning and execution of military operations.

3. (S/TK) Progress toward improved support of military commanders resulting from these procedures, while significant, has been insufficient. The restrictions and prohibitions in the present TALENT-KEYHOLE program, are no longer required. I consider that collateral and COMINT security systems will adequately protect sensitive products of satellite reconnaissance. Accordingly, I believe it is time we considered a major expansion of the decompartmentation program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a study on the compartmentation of satellite reconnaissance products. The study will be forwarded under separate cover for your information.

4. (S/TK) Specifically, I propose that all imagery and signals intelligence products of satellite reconnaissance be disseminated outside the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment at the earliest time possible after processing of raw film and intercepted signals has been completed. Roll film processed by the National Reconnaissance Office should be classified in accordance with

Classified by TK-1
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFY ON Notification by
Originator

Executive Order 11652 and disseminated in collateral channels. Satellite-collected imagery and non-COMINT product, and selected sensor data should be authorized for release at SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL levels and protected in accordance with Executive Order 11652. An exception will be specially sensitive material classified TOP SECRET, again in accordance with Executive Order 11652. COMINT is sufficiently protected by provision of the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations (CISR). Existing collateral provisions, in accordance with DOD Instruction 5200.1R and DOD Directive 5210.8 for use in an emergency, including disclosure to uncleared persons, should be applied.

5. (S/TK) I also propose that the "fact of" a SIGINT satellite reconnaissance program be removed from the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment.

a. Imagery satellite reconnaissance should be classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL.

b. ELINT satellite reconnaissance should be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

c. COMINT satellite reconnaissance should be classified SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY. Further I believe there should be no blanket restriction on foreign disclosure of decompartmented satellite products.

6. (S/TK) I recognize that such an extension of the decompartmentation program is a most significant step. However, I believe that the overall sensitivity of satellite reconnaissance per se and its imagery and SIGINT products can now be adequately

25X1

protected by Executive Order 11652 safeguards or, in the case of COMINT, by COMINT controls and no longer warrants the severe restrictions on information flow and employment of intelligence analytical resources caused by a special security compartment. I therefore seek your cooperation in obtaining the necessary easement from the President.

Reference:
*US Intelligence Board memorandum, USIB-SC-10.5/17, 23 January 1973, "Sanitization, Downgrading and Decontrol of SIGINT Data Derived from TALENT-KEYHOLE Sources"

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓ w/o attachment		
2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI	✓			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/IC		✓	w/o attachment	
9	D/DCI/NIO				
10	GC				
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19					
20					
21					
22					
	SUSPENSE	1 Apr ✓ Date			

Remarks:

Pls develop DCI acknowledgment & comment.

25X1 25 Mar. Date

3637 (1-75)

S-28